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ARTICLE
Nicole E. Negowetti
Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science
Primer for Civil Litigators
Abstract. Cognitive science has revealed that past experiences and prior
assumptions, even those of which we are not conscious, greatly influence
how humans perceive the world. Emerging research has demonstrated that
attorneys and judges, like everyone else, are the products of their gender,
ethnicity, race, and socioeconomic status. As a consequence, legal
decision-making is susceptible to the subtle influences of implicit bias.
Effective and ethical client advocacy requires an attorney to understand
how her own implicit biases will affect her interactions with clients. An
attorney should also acknowledge that implicit biases may affect a judge’s
interpretation of her client’s story and legal arguments. This Article
explains how insights from cognitive science should inform an attorney’s
representation of clients in civil litigation.
Author. Nicole Negowetti is an Assistant Professor of Law at Valparaiso
University Law School. She teaches Torts, Food Law & Policy, Pretrial
Litigation Drafting, and Legal Writing. Professor Negowetti’s research
interests include judicial decision-making, law and cognitive science, legal
ethics, and food law. Prior to joining the Valparaiso faculty, Professor
Negowetti practiced commercial and employment litigation at Sheehan
Phinney Bass & Green PA in Manchester, N.H. After graduating magna
cum laude from the University of New Hampshire School of Law,
Professor Negowetti clerked for the Honorable Carol Ann Conboy of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most lawyers mistakenly view reason and logic as both the primary
motivator of their behavior and the primary tool to change the thinking
and behavior of others. However, emerging cognitive science research has
revealed that our seemingly neutral, logical, and reasoned judgments are
actually influenced by unconscious frameworks of thinking about the
world that are triggered by our autonomic nervous system.1 It is now
generally understood that the impact of past experiences and prior
assumptions, even those of which we are not conscious, can have great
power in directing all humans’ present perceptions, judgments, feelings,
and behaviors.2 Underlying our thinking is a complex system of
unconscious judgments of people, places, and situations, of which we are
unaware.3
Humans create blueprints based on prior experiences to evaluate new
situations, people, and themselves.4 We rely on mental shortcuts, which
psychologists often refer to as “heuristics” or “schemas,” to make complex
decisions.5 As with other schemas, stereotypes can facilitate the rapid
categorization of people and allow us to “save cognitive resources.”6
However, reliance on these cognitive shortcuts can also lead to erroneous
and biased judgments.7 While “explicit” biases are attitudes and
1. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1217 (2004).
2. ZIVA KUNDA, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE, SOCIAL COGNITION 211 (1999).
3. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121 (1994) (“One
reason we have used the term contamination is to draw an analogy to contamination in the physical
realm . . . . One difference between physical and mental contamination, however, concerns their ease
of detection. It is much more difficult to detect mental contamination, particularly at the individual
level.”).
4. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, VT. L. REV. 681,
700 (1994) (explaining the “mental blueprints” humans use for quick assessments of new experiences,
based on prior experiences).
5. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations.”).
6. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700
(1994) (“These [schemas] allow us to economize on mental energy: we need not interpret things
afresh when there are preexisting categories that cover the experience or condition in question.”); see
also C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About Others,
51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2000) (“In attempting to make sense of other people, we regularly
construct and use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception
process.”).
7. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic Cognitive
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stereotypes that are consciously accessible through introspection, “implicit”
biases are not consciously accessible.8 These biases are more likely to
emerge during stressful situations or when someone must make a decision
under time constraints.9 Regardless of conscious and explicit desires for
unbiased decision-making, implicit biases “can produce behavior that
diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.”10
Furthermore, studies have shown that when a person believes himself to be
objective, he is more susceptible to biases.11
In light of this research, “[w]hat, if anything, should we do about
implicit bias in the courtroom? In other words, how concerned should we
be that judges, advocates, litigants, and jurors come to the table with
implicit biases that influence how they interpret evidence, understand
facts, parse legal principles, and make judgment calls?”12 As lawyers, our
ethical obligations to our clients and the justice system require us to be
very concerned about implicit bias in our courtrooms. These issues have
not only captured the attention of academics and scientists, but also the
American Bar Association, the National Center for State Courts, and the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System have
recognized that implicit biases present a serious problem for the
administration of justice in the legal system, and they have thus
implemented initiatives to address the issue.13 Our adversarial system
Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); see also
Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012) (explaining
that our decisions are influenced by “a long litany of biases”). See generally Jean R. Sternlight &
Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and
Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437 (2008) (applying psychological insights to
the practice of law).
8. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1229 (2004) (contending that to
overcome implicit bias, a person must not “already be too cognitively busy or occupied” when
receiving new information because “the more cognitively busy individuals are,” the more those
individuals must rely on schemas and stereotypes to guide judgments).
10. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).
11. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012)
(citing Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of SelfPerceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007)) (reviewing a study where participants that were primed to see
themselves as objective actually showed more bias in their evaluations of a potential employee).
12. Id. at 1126 (emphasis omitted).
13. See PAMELA M. CASEY, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/
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strives to be fair, predictable, and uniform.14 The rule of law would be
compromised if case outcomes varied because of a judge’s social status or
because a litigant is from a minority group.15
Attorneys16 and judges17 are not immune from these influences,
although most would consider themselves to be objective and fairminded.18 A federal district court judge explained how his self-confidence
in colorblindness was shaken after he received the results of the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) that measures implicit racial bias:
I was eager to take the test. I knew I would “pass” with flying colors. I
didn’t.
. . . After much research, I ultimately realized that the problem of implicit
bias is a little recognized and even less addressed flaw in our legal system . . . .
I have discovered that we unconsciously act on implicit biases even though
we abhor them when they come to our attention. Implicit biases cause
subtle actions, . . . [b]ut they are also powerful and pervasive enough to affect
decisions about whom we employ, whom we leave on juries, and whom we
believe. Jurors, lawyers, and judges do not leave behind their implicit biases
when they walk through the courthouse doors.19
media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx
(evaluating the programs implemented by three states to reduce the effect of implicit bias); NATALIE
KNOWLTON & MALIA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION 32 (2012), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/
IAALS_Level_the_Playing_Field_FINAL.pdf (providing empirically based strategies for reducing
implicit bias in the judicial system); Task Force on Implicit Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (educating lawyers
and judges about the “pervasive implications and effects of implicit bias”); Gender and Racial Fairness
Resource Guide, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/
Gender-and-Racial-Fairness/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (describing state efforts
to eliminate bias in the courtroom through the creation of task forces).
14. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience,
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 349 (2012).
15. Id.
16. One study showed that even death penalty defense lawyers—who are perceived as
committed to racial justice and equality—harbor the same implicit biases held by the majority of
Americans. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004).
17. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
706 (2013) (asserting that judges “most assuredly” have implicit biases).
18. See id. (“Of course, ‘[m]ost judges view themselves as objective and especially talented at
fair decision[-]making.’” (quoting Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1124, 1172 (2012))).
19. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV.
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Recent legal scholarship—applying cognitive science research to address
the impact of implicit bias on decision-making20—has focused on how
judges can mitigate the effects of their own implicit biases.21 These
solutions call for decisionmakers to understand that they are predisposed to
making irrational, biased decisions.22 Less attention, however, has been
given to the role of attorneys in recognizing their own predispositions to
implicit bias and how cognitive science research should inform their
advocacy.23 The goal of this Article is to make a modest contribution to
the implicit bias legal scholarship by identifying some pitfalls of implicit
biases in client representation and outlining several strategies for effective
advocacy in light of cognitive science research.
An attorney must first understand how implicit biases affect her own
thinking and thus, her relationship with her client. In the following
section, this Article presents a brief overview of some of the relevant
cognitive science research to frame the discussion of how attorneys’
decisions are influenced by implicit biases. It explains why attorneys must
be vigilant about relying on their assumptions, and proposes some practical
solutions for mitigating the effects of implicit biases in the representation
of clients. Section III discusses how knowledge of implicit biases and their
effect on judicial decision-making should inform an attorney’s case
strategies. In other words, how can attorneys present their cases in ways
that will help judges avoid deferring to their implicit biases? Although
attorneys may appeal to a judge’s biases and predilections when it is
favorable to their client’s positions, this Article is concerned with the
pejorative effects of implicit biases in the courtroom, and takes the position

L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010).
20. The effects of implicit biases on jury decisions have also been studied. See generally Anna
Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827
(2012) (exploring the effect of implicit bias on the jury process and discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of various proposals to remedy the effect of implicit bias).
21. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1169 (2012)
(offering strategies to mitigate the effects of implicit bias); Nicole Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking,
Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (arguing that judicial empathy is a
prerequisite for moving judges “away from their own biased vantage point”).
22. Cf. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1172 (2012)
(urging judges and jurors to doubt their own objectivity in order to reduce the effects of their implicit
biases).
23. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1272 (2002) (“[T]he main purpose of this Article . . . is to inform advocacy
practice with current science [regarding stereotypes and prejudice] and to encourage other legal
scholars to attend to the many implications of current scientific research.”).
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that legal judgments tainted by implicit biases have detrimental effects on
the administration of justice. “Because unconscious bias has the potential
to undermine the fairness of legal proceedings, efforts to minimize the
effects of unconscious bias within the participants to such proceedings is a
desirable goal toward furthering fundamental fairness.”24
II. IMPLICIT BIASES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ATTORNEYS’
DECISION-MAKING
A. Brief Overview of Cognitive Science Research
Although lawyers may consider reason and logic as the driving force
behind their behavior, judgments are often based on implicit biases, which
act “as a lens through which we view the world. . . . [They] automatically
filter[] how we take in and act on information.”25 Scientists who study
human reasoning agree that it occurs via a “dual process” cognitive
system.26 “System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System II is more
deliberative, calculative, slower, and is often more likely to be errorfree.”27 System I mental processes affect social judgments such as whom
we favor,28 but they operate without conscious awareness or intentional
control.29 Implicit biases are automatic, unconscious mental processes
based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes that are formed by one’s
life experiences and lurk beneath the surface of the conscious.30 System I
processes elucidate our implicit biases.31 Implicit biases are rooted in the
basic way in which humans understand the complex flood of information
24. Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1582 (2013).
25. Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, at
16, 17, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit%
20Bias_0.pdf.
26. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 974
(2006).
27. Id.
28. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2010).
29. Id.; see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (explaining that implicit cognition represents the
unconscious, or unintentional control over “social perception, impression formation, and judgment”
motivating people’s actions).
30. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006).
31. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969,
975 (2006) (“[T]he problem of implicit bias is best understood in light of existing analyses of System
I processes.”).
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from the world.32 Cognitive structures, called schemas,33 are “mental
blueprints” that allow an individual to understand new people,
circumstances, objects, and their relationships to each other, by using an
existing framework of stored knowledge based on prior experiences.34
Schemas are cognitive shortcuts allowing us to comprehend “new
situations and ideas without having to interpret and construct a diagram of
inferences and relationships for the first time.”35 When we see or think of
a concept, the schema is activated unconsciously.36 The schema brings to
mind other information that we associate with the original concept.37 Put
another way, these mental blueprints sort “our experiences and acquired
knowledge” and organize them into categories that function like
containers.38 “[S]chemas influence every feature of human cognition,
affecting not only what information receives attention, but also how that
information is categorized, what inferences are drawn from it, and what is
or is not remembered.”39 We automatically infer character from behavior,
“experience affective reactions to a variety of objects,” and behave in

32. See id. (stating that implicit bias is “largely automatic” and that because it occurs so rapidly,
often there is no time for consideration or correction).
33. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2005) (defining a
schema as a “cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus,
including its attributes and the relations among those attributes” (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE &
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98 (2d ed. 1991))).
34. Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700
(1994).
35. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009).
36. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 303 (1999) (“[A] wide
range of our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can be triggered automatically by particular
conflagrations of cues, without any intention or awareness on our part.”).
37. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (2008)
(providing an example of a schema that “fancy restaurants in suburbs are likely to be a site of
discrimination against black customers,” which would be “informed by specific knowledge of the
long history of anti[-]black discrimination in restaurants” (footnote omitted)); Richard K. Sherwin,
The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700 (1994) (“Consider, for example,
the schema that applies to the following situation: John went to a party. The next morning he woke up
with a headache. Now it is common knowledge that people drink too much at parties and wake up
the next day feeling hungover. The situation described leaves out the explanation. But we have no
trouble supplying it. There is a schema in our head that quickly comes to mind to provide that
explanation.”).
38. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009).
39. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1131 (2004).
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accordance with traits prompted by recent experiences.40 For example, if
an individual is introduced as a professor, a “professor schema” may be
activated and we might associate this person with wisdom, authority, or
past experiences with a professor. In this way, we can understand how
stereotypes are formed—they are developed from our experiences and the
associations our minds make between concepts, such as social groups, and
certain attributes.41
People create different event schemas, or scripts, which help them to
understand how a process, or event, occurs.42 Because individual
experiences create schemas, the way each person perceives a particular
situation may be different.43 When an individual’s cognitive mind
unconsciously selects a script to interpret a situation, that individual’s
judgments “will be based on the assumptions derived from” the social
knowledge embedded in the script, rather than on the unique
characteristics of the particular situation.44 Scripts not only function as
cognitive shortcuts that provide meaning to a set of events, but they also
reinforce traditional cultural and societal values.45 For example, in a study
40. ZIVA KUNDA, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE, SOCIAL COGNITION 303 (1999).
41. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 741 (1995) (“Stereotypes consist of well-learned sets of
associations among groups and traits established in children’s memories at an early age, before they
have the cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal acceptability of the stereotypes.”
(footnote omitted)).
42. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2004) (“Scripts are in some ways like
recipes—helping us interpret both the things we see and the things we do not see. If we observe a
person paying a bill and leaving a restaurant, a restaurant script triggers knowledge of earlier events
that have happened: The customer has ordered, been served, and eaten food.”).
43. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–19
(2008) (explaining how white and black observers perceived differently a scenario in which an
African-American family is seated near the back of the restaurant and for ten minutes, the parents
attempt to get the waiter’s attention to ask for menus and order food). Professor Robinson predicts
that white participants would likely state they did not consider that the placement of the family’s
table might have a racial correlation, while black observers might fill in the informational gaps with
the assistance of a schema, such as, “fancy restaurants in suburbs are likely to be a site of
discrimination against black customers.” Id.
44. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 299 (2009); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
997, 1006 (2006) (“In discrimination cases, as elsewhere, judges are constantly using ‘intuitive’ or
‘common sense’ psychological theories in the construction and justification of legal doctrines and in
their application to specific legal disputes.”).
45. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1132 (2004) (“[O]ne of the key
findings of social cognition literature is that the absence of clear concepts and categories increases the
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conducted by the Heldrich Center for Workplace Development at Rutgers
University, “[h]alf of the African-American respondents said that ‘AfricanAmericans are treated unfairly in the workplace,’ while just 10% of white
respondents agreed with that statement. Thirteen percent of nonblack
people of color shared this perception.”46 There is also evidence from
polls, while mixed, suggesting that men and women perceive
discrimination differently.47 For example, in a recent Pew Research
survey, 75% of Millennial women said that more changes are necessary to
attain gender parity in the workplace; only 57% of Millennial men
agreed.48
Although relying on schemas, such as stereotypes, is cognitively efficient,
“the price we pay for such efficiency is bias in our perceptions and
judgments.”49 It is extremely difficult for the individual to deviate from
what the script has taught her about the world because the outcome
suggested by the script will seem to be a natural result of precedent
events.50 Stereotypes are resistant to change because perceptions become
impervious to new information.51 People give more consideration to
information that is consonant with a stereotype and give less credence to
information that is stereotype-inconsistent; they not only seek out
information that is consistent with the stereotype, but also better
cognitive energies required to process information and thus deters individuals from learning new
ideas or processing new information.”).
46. Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2008)
(quoting K.A. DIXON, DUKE STOREN & CARL E. VAN HORN, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR
WORKPLACE DEV., RUTGERS UNIV., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW
DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 8 (2002), available at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/
sites/default/files/content/A_Workplace_Divided.pdf.).
47. See, e.g., id. at 1113 (highlighting data that suggests men and women perceive
discrimination, particularly sexual harassment, differently).
48. On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity—For Now, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennialwomen-near-parity-for-now/.
49. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (citing RICHARD E.
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 113–38 (1980)).
50. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009); see also Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15
(1984) (“Man inadvertently reveals certain judgmental tendencies in coping with the world.
Whenever he responds, Man depends on what first comes to mind, on what is available. He judges
frequency, probability, and causality on the basis of the most easily generated information.”
(footnotes omitted)).
51. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (citing RICHARD E.
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 113–38 (1980)).
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remember stereotype-consistent information.52 “[W]e see what we expect
to see. Like well-accepted theories that guide our interpretation of data,
schemas incline us to interpret data consistent with our biases.”53
In the 1990s, Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald, and their
colleagues developed the Implicit Associations Test (IAT) and have since
been using the test to conduct social cognition research on implicit racial
bias.54 The IAT pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an
evaluative dimension (good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and
speed indicate implicit and automatic attitudes and stereotypes.55 For
example, in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together pictures
of African-American faces with positive words from the evaluative
dimension.56 The strength of the attitude or stereotype is determined by
the speed at which the participant pairs the words.57 The results from
hundreds of thousands of IATs taken on the IAT project’s website expose
systematic implicit racial biases.58
There is a trove of evidence suggesting that implicit biases, measured by
the IAT, can affect interaction with others59 and can predict
discriminatory behavior in the real world.60 For example, an experiment
52. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, U. CIN. L.
REV. 97, 143 (2010) (“Just as one tends to seek out information that confirms one’s expectations, one
also tends to better remember expectation-consistent information.” (footnote omitted)).
53. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1515 (2005) (footnote
omitted) (citing EDWARD E. SAMPSON, DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 121–22 (1999)).
54. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, SelfEsteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E.
McGhee, & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998).
55. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 355 (2007) (citing Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be
Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117,
123 (Henry L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 2001)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Clear evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit bias comes from Project Implicit, a research
website operated by research scientists, technicians, and laboratories at Harvard University,
Washington University, and the University of Virginia. About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT,
http://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
59. JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4
(2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/
PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 954 (2006) (“[M]any
studies that have used an IAT attitude measure have also included a measure of one or more social
behaviors that are theoretically expected to be related to attitude or stereotype measures.”).
60. See JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4
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featuring doctors making patient assessments provides an example of
discriminatory behavior predicted by implicit bias measures.61 “Physicians
with stronger implicit anti-black attitudes and stereotypes” were not as
likely to prescribe a medical procedure for African-Americans compared to
white Americans with the same medical profiles.62 In addition, implicit
measures are relatively better predictors of “spontaneous behaviors such as
eye contact, seating distance, and other such actions that communicate
social warmth or discomfort.”63 When interacting with a member of a
stigmatized group, a person with a more resilient adverse attitude toward
that particular group tends to display more negative behaviors, such as
blinking, and fewer positive behaviors, like smiling.64 Significantly,
implicit biases cause a person to interpret identical actions by people of
various racial and ethnic groups differently, depending on one’s own group
membership.65 For example, people with higher implicit bias towards
(2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/
PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf (“There is increasing evidence that implicit biases,
as measured by the IAT, do predict behavior in the real world—in ways that can have real effects on
real lives.”); Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007) (noting that implicit bias predicts discriminatory
behaviors in individuals); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 759 (2001) (revealing that implicit bias
predicts more negative evaluations of agentic (i.e., confident, aggressive, ambitious) women in certain
hiring conditions); see also Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence 5
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007), available at
http://ftp.iza.org/dp2764.pdf (reporting that implicit bias predicts the rate of callback interviews
based on an implicit stereotype in Sweden that Arabs are lazy).
61. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 430 (2007).
62. Id.
63. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006); see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing
Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 640 (2003)
(explaining that implicit bias predicts how individuals read the friendliness of facial expressions).
64. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007); see JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS.,
IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.p
df (“[I]mplicit bias predicts awkward body language[,] which could influence whether folks feel that
they are being treated fairly or courteously.” (citations omitted)).
65. See Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007) (showing that “[p]eople with higher implicit bias judged
ambiguous actions by a black or Turkish target more negatively” than ambiguous actions by a white
target (citations omitted)); see also Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
REL. 133, 134 (2002) (reviewing research that shows implicit bias predicts more negative evaluations
of ambiguous actions by an African-American).
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certain groups judged ambiguous actions and facial expressions by
members of that group more negatively.66 These manifestations of
implicit bias, even among people who strive to be impartial, can
significantly impact an attorney’s ability to effectively represent clients.67
B. Reducing the Effects of Implicit Bias in Client Representation
Cognitive science teaches us that our own experience is the unconscious
starting point for decision-making and provides a lens through which we
understand others.68 Although reliance on ingrained schemas is difficult
to overcome, implicit biases caused by categories and schemas may be
mitigated, or even eliminated,69 by first recognizing that race, gender,
sexual orientation, and other social categories may be influencing decisionmaking; in doing so we rely “less mindlessly on a given schema and
scrutinize[] more thoroughly the available data.”70 Research shows that
“[t]he path from implicit bias to negative behavior does not appear
immutable.”71 Awareness of implicit biases and motivation to act in a
non-prejudiced manner are critical to mitigating the effects of implicit bias
on behavior.72
“Current models of prejudice and stereotype reduction argue that
prejudice-free responses require perceivers to be aware of their biases; to be
motivated to change their responses because of personal values, feelings of
guilt, compunction, or self-insight; and to possess cognitive resources
necessary to develop and practice correction strategies.”73 Experiments
66. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007).
67. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 411 (2002) (“Those biases will have a substantial effect on our work if we do
not confront them.”).
68. Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, at
16, 17, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit
%20Bias_0.pdf; see also Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 408 (2002) (“[A]s a professional you need to explore and confront
your own cultural influences and the extent of your unconscious (or conscious) biases, including your
own racism, sexism, and homophobia.”).
69. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures
on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1229 (2004) (suggesting that biases and reliance
on schemas may be eliminated).
70. Id.
71. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 437 (2007).
72. Id.; see also Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 143–44 (2010) (agreeing that it is possible to control “the effects of automatic
stereotypes”).
73. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes:
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conducted by Irene Blair and Mahzarin Banaji revealed that, while
stereotype activation is an automatic process, people can control or
eliminate the effect of stereotypes on their judgments if they have the
intention to do so and their cognitive resources are not over-constrained.74
Reliance on implicit biases is thus mitigated through creative analysis,75
which includes the “creation of new categories, openness to new
information, and awareness of more than one perspective.”76
A growing body of research provides evidence that perspective-taking, or
imagining oneself in the shoes of someone from a different social or ethnic
group, is a cognitive strategy that can reduce stereotyping.77 To
successfully perform this “particular feat of mental gymnastics,” a person
must actively consider another person’s mental state and then try to
experience or infer the other person’s perceptions.78 Recent experiments
using various interventions to make participants engage in more
perspective-taking have demonstrated that actively contemplating others’
psychological experiences weakens the “automatic expression of racial
biases.”79 For example, in one experiment, before viewing a five-minute
video of a black man being treated worse than an identically situated white
man, participants were asked to imagine “what they might be thinking,
feeling, and experiencing if they were Glen [the black man], looking at the
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001) (citations omitted).
74. Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype
Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1159 (1996).
75. See Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009,
at 16, 19, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit
%20Bias_0.pdf (“Mindfulness is a concept drawn from the cognitive behavioral therapies that
encourage being in the moment, understanding your thought processes, developing awareness, and
challenging thinking errors.”).
76. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1235 (2004) (quoting ELLEN LANGER,
MINDFULNESS 61–79 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 708, 722 (2000) (concluding that perspective-taking can diminish an individual’s
application of stereotypes).
78. See Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ Shoes,
in HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 295, 297 (Keith D. Markman et al.
eds., 2009) (“[T]here is no more immediate barrier to accurate perspective[-]taking than failing to use
it in the first place.”).
79. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1027 (2011); see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1103, 1233 (2011) (detailing psychological research that suggests ways to reduce the effects of
cognitive biases).
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world through his eyes and walking in his shoes as he goes through the
various activities depicted in the documentary.”80 The control group was
told to “remain objective and emotionally detached.”81 In other
variations, requiring participants to write an essay imagining a day in the
life of a young black male triggered perspective-taking.82 These
perspective-taking activities substantially decreased implicit bias as
measured by the IAT and behavioral changes.83 For example, the
researchers found that those in the perspective-taking condition chose to
sit closer to a black interviewer,84 and black experimenters rated their
interaction with white participants put in the perspective-taking condition
more positively.85
As discussed below, understanding how judgments are susceptible to the
influence of implicit bias and being motivated to control the effects of
biases are critical to effective and ethical client representation.
C. Advocacy and Decision-making: Understanding the Impact of Implicit
Bias
An attorney has ethical obligations as “a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice.”86 As one who is obligated to “seek
improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession,”87 an
attorney should be concerned about the influence of implicit biases on her
80. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011); see also Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B.
Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group
Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 721 (2000) (reporting that perspective-taking
decreases “the accessibility and application of stereotypes”).
81. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011).
82. Id. at 1031.
83. Id. at 1035; see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002) (showing that people may not be able to do much
about the automatic activation of stereotypes, but they can behave “in substantially nonprejudiced
ways” if properly motivated); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 963–65 (2006) (“Implicit biases are malleable.”);
Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 438 (2007) (“Conscious exertion to be unbiased may—at least temporarily—
reduce implicit bias.”).
84. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1035 (2011).
85. Id. at 1037.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1) (2011).
87. Id. at pmbl (6).
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own judgment and in legal decision-making.88 As the ABA’s Task Force
on Implicit Bias has stated, “[U]nderstanding implicit bias and ways to
debias one’s approach to law-related issues and decisions is critical to a fair
and representative perception and reality of access to justice and equity.”89
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from
exhibiting bias or prejudice “based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, . . . when such
actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.”90 Thus,
understanding one’s own implicit biases is also critical for ethical and
effective client representation.91 To do so requires the attorney to explore
and acknowledge her own implicit biases resulting from cultural and
societal influences, which may manifest as unconscious racism, sexism,
ageism, or homophobia.92
These implicit biases can influence an attorney’s interactions with a
client from the first meeting and interview.93 As experienced attorneys
88. See What Is Implicit or Unconscious Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias/what-is-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014)
(highlighting the problems created by implicit biases, particularly in the legal profession); cf. Carolyn
Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 329, 330 (2006)
(expressing concern that lawyers do not hear their clients’ stories, thus hindering effective
representation); Linda F. Smith, Always Judged—Case Study of an Interview Using Conversation
Analysis, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 423, 441 (2009) (“Ethnographic studies that have considered attorneyclient conversations focus on the relationship that the attorney and client develop and the degree to
which the attorney comes to understand the client’s perspective. These studies have been largely
critical of the attorneys, noting their substantial failure to understand or honor the clients’ views.”).
89. What Is Implicit or Unconscious Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias/what-is-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2011); see also Debra Lyn Bassett,
Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563,
1578 (2013) (reiterating that ethical rules preclude lawyers from discriminatory manifestations).
91. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 407–08 (2002) (advocating that attorneys examine and confront their own
implicit biases).
92. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 769 (2004) (noting the potential
for implicit bias to negatively affect the attorney-client relationship, and urging lawyers to
acknowledge those biases in order to work toward overcoming them); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing
and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 415–16 (2002)
(calling for lawyers to “confront their own cultural identity, including the biases and prejudices that
accompany that identity”).
93. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 769 (2004) (“You may feel that
you could never possibly understand your client because the two of you differ so much in terms of
gender, race, class, culture, religion, sexual orientation, or citizenship status or other factors.”); Paul
R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
373, 408 (2002) (describing how implicit biases can be detrimental to effective representation of
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understand, establishing rapport and gaining trust are critical to effective
client representation.94 A lawyer must gain the client’s trust and
confidence to understand the client’s goals and objectives.95 Psychological
research demonstrates that people usually remember and reveal more
information when they feel at ease, and they may be more willing to accept
professional advice when they trust their advisor.96 Certain behaviors,
such as leaning forward when speaking to a person, not crossing one’s
arms, smiling, and nodding have been shown to help establish rapport.97
However, implicit biases can impede an attorney’s ability to establish
rapport because an attorney who harbors implicit biases about a particular
group may exhibit negative behaviors, such as unevenness in eye contact,
leaning back, or looking down while taking notes.98 When interviewing a
client who is a member of a stigmatized group, an attorney unaware of her
implicit biases and their effects could unconsciously send signals of distrust
or disinterest to the client with her tone of voice, demeanor, eye contact,
facial expressions, and body language.99
Attorneys can establish rapport during client interviews by allowing
clients to describe their situation in their own words without interruptions,
engaging in “active listening,” and showing empathy by acknowledging the
clients); cf. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 442 (2007) (analyzing court opinions that recognize “implicit bias
may affect the perceptions of participants in the legal system”).
94. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 442 (2008); see
also Linda F. Smith, Was It Good for You Too? Conversation Analysis of Two Interviews, 96 KY. L.J.
579, 643–47 (2008) (encouraging attorneys to allow the client “substantial opportunity to talk” in
order to establish rapport). See generally Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality
in Lawyer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755 (2004)
(providing practitioners with tips and guidelines for establishing a good lawyer-client relationship).
95. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437,
499 (2008) (“Trust is central to the attorney-client relationship.”).
96. Id. at 503.
97. Id.; see also Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogue and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 762 (2004) (explaining how to
convey “empathy, sympathy, approval and support,” and stressing their efficacy in good lawyer-client
communication).
98. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006) (asserting that implicit biases can predict
“spontaneous behaviors” like eye contact and seating distance); Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007)
(“Nonverbal behaviors such as facial expressions, eye contact, and body posture have been shown to
leak implicit attitudes.”).
99. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007).
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client’s feelings.100 Because a client’s background and facts may be
completely different from any situation an attorney has experienced
personally, it is important for the attorney to listen attentively to absorb
and appreciate the client’s specific circumstances, feelings, and goals.101
As the research described in the previous section suggests, perspectivetaking can mitigate the effects of implicit bias.102 Effective lawyers
already understand the importance of perspective-taking when
representing clients.103 Professor Menkel-Meadow emphasizes that
“lawyers need to learn to experience ‘the other’ from the values that the
other holds, not those of the lawyer—this is the challenge of most lawyer–
client relations and lawyer–opposing side relations.”104 Professor Grose
has likewise stated, “Being a lawyer is about representing people: asking
questions that elicit stories that we can hear and understand and retell. To
be able to ask those questions and hear and retell those stories, we must
learn to understand human motivation that is different from our own.”105
To understand the experiences, behaviors, and feelings of others as they
experience them requires lawyers to put aside their own biases, prejudices,
and points of view.106
Attorneys have a duty to “act with reasonable diligence.”107 This
means that a lawyer must “act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s
behalf.”108 In order to represent a client’s interest diligently, an attorney
must first understand the client’s goals and motives.109 Implicit biases
100. Linda F. Smith, Always Judged—Case Study of an Interview Using Conversation Analysis, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 423, 441 (2010); Linda F. Smith, Was It Good for You Too? Conversation Analysis
of Two Interviews, 96 KY. L.J. 579, 579–80 (2008).
101. Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client Relationships:
Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 763 (2004).
102. See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial
Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011) (recounting an experiment in
which perspective-taking reduced the effect of implicit bias).
103. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing
from the MacCrate Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593,
620 (1994) (“[T]he good lawyer needs to understand, from a human point of view, what the other
wants to happen in the world . . . .”).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . . and Beyond: Some Thoughts on “Outsider
Narrative” in a Law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 126 (1997).
106. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436,
543 (2008) (“[A]ttorneys need to be aware of the use of such heuristics in their own thinking.”).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011).
108. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
109. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
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may interfere with an attorney’s ability to comprehend and represent a
client’s story.110 Attorneys may be implicitly biased by the appearance of
their clients, their race, religion, or age, which could lead to incorrect
presumptions and judgments.111 For example, an attorney may assume
that an untidy woman is an unfit parent, or that a disabled person should
be identified as a victim.112 Assumptions and implicit biases may prevent
an attorney from learning all information potentially advantageous to
understanding her client’s goals and experiences.113 These biases will
operate to categorize clients and their cases based on experiences with other
clients or assumptions about them.114 When interviewing a client, an
attorney may be inclined to ask narrowly tailored questions that confirm,
rather than challenge, those assumptions.115 Recognizing the tendency
for implicit biases to affect one’s judgments about people can help an
attorney make efforts to ask questions that will take him beyond these
stereotypes.116
Ignoring the influence of implicit bias will lead an attorney to risk
misunderstanding her clients.117 This misunderstanding may cause
frustration (“My client just isn’t making any sense!”),118 and perhaps more
significantly, failure to achieve the client’s objectives.119 Our assumptions
and implicit biases about who people are, their behavior, and their needs,
among other characteristics, can impair our ability to understand the actual

Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 497 (2008)
(“They may feel a wide variety of emotions relating to their situation—including anger, guilt,
embarrassment, or fear—and may be interested in pursuing a wide variety of goals.”).
110. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 408 (2002) (“[A]s a professional you need to explore and confront
your own cultural influences and the extent of your unconscious (or conscious) biases . . . .”).
111. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 459 (2008).
112. See, e.g., Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights
Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 252 (2001) (pointing out potential issues that may arise as a
result of stereotypes in a lawyer–client relationship where the client is disabled).
113. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 459–60
(2008).
114. See id. at 530 (“[D]ecisionmaking is often influenced by such previous investments.”).
115. Id. at 455–56.
116. See id. at 456 (“[I]t is also possible that lawyers could use their experiences to construct
and pursue alternative hypotheses that broaden the inquiry.”).
117. Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 412 (2002).
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
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person before us.120 Professor Grose has asserted that attorneys must
“engage in critical reflection” to recognize the assumptions through which
we filter all information, such as how we define and classify individuals
who seek out our legal advice.121 Reflecting upon the influence of
implicit biases will lead an attorney to question why connecting with or
understanding the client is difficult.122 Understanding the role of implicit
biases in coloring perceptions can help an attorney appreciate a client’s
story that appears to make little sense or a client’s decision to pursue what
appears to be an ill-conceived strategy, which “might be perfectly
reasonable with another’s lens and another’s bundle of preferences and
values.”123 Additionally, recognizing the distorting effects of implicit
biases on another person’s stories and experiences can help an attorney be
less judgmental about her clients’ values and decisions.124
Lawyering also requires the exercise of judgment regarding a client’s
available choices.125 According to Model Rule 2.1, “[i]n representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to
law but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social[,] and
political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”126 An
attorney’s implicit biases and other schemas will affect how she
understands her client and may determine the advice she provides to the
client.127 For example, schemas may cause the attorney to make incorrect
120. Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REV.
329, 358–59 (2006).
121. Id. at 359.
122. Id.
123. Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 412 (2002) (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 531 (2008)
(explaining that an attorney must “do her best to describe client options in an evenhanded manner”).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011).
127. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1578 (2013) (positing that unconscious bias can affect interaction with
clients); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 452 (2008)
(“[P]reconceptions can be important to interpreting data and therefore can strongly influence all
other tasks that depend on this most basic inferential undertaking.” (quoting RICHARD E. NISBETT
& LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 67
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 430 (2007) (reporting that
physicians with stronger anti-black implicit attitudes were not as likely to prescribe certain
medications to black patients than similarly situated white patients).
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assumptions about the clients’ goals.128 Although an attorney’s primary
objective in resolving a dispute may be to maximize his monetary recovery,
his client may be more concerned with repairing a relationship, obtaining
an apology, or dealing with the emotions, such as guilt, embarrassment, or
fear, triggered by the situation.129 Understanding how these initial
schemas can influence perception may allow the attorney to realize that the
client is concerned primarily with non-monetary issues, and that the
client’s dispute might be better resolved through courses of action other
than litigation.130 As Rule 2.1 indicates, an attorney should consider
relevant moral, economic, and social considerations when advising a
client.131 Determining whether these considerations are relevant may
require an attorney to move beyond her schemas.132
An attorney must not only comprehend her client’s story, but must then
“stand in the shoes” of the client when she communicates the client’s
experiences, goals, and aspirations to a legal audience.133 As storytellers,
lawyers weigh factors such as the law, the audience, and the client’s goals to
craft the story.134 They must distill facts and decide which ones are

128. See Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 361 (2007) (discussing a study which determined that
plaintiffs’ litigation objectives “rarely correlated with what legal actors perceived as their prime
litigation aims”); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436,
453 (2008) (commenting that lawyers’ schemas may make them focus more on monetary recovery as
a measure of success in litigation, rather than the client’s particular needs or goals).
129. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 497 (2008); see
also Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship,
6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 260 (2000) (claiming that the lawyer–client relationship will “be enhanced
by the lawyer’s recognition and resolution of strong emotional reactions—positive or negative—
towards a client” and, conversely, “a lawyer’s inability to come to terms with such emotions” affect
the representation).
130. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011); see also Jean R. Sternlight &
Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and
Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008) (urging lawyers to consider
“non-legal issues” as part of “the ethical practice of law”).
132. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008).
133. See id. at 491 (“[T]he relevant psychology suggests that the empathetic lawyer can . . .
learn more from and provide more information to his client, as well as build better rapport and
trust.”).
134. Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from Clinic to
the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 44 (2010).
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significant.135 In writing the story for the court, the lawyer chooses each
word and how to tell the story.136 By “pick[ing] and choos[ing] from
available facts to present a picture of what happened,”137 a story told by a
lawyer reflects what matters to her.138 Each element of the story is the
product of conscious and unconscious choices made by the storyteller.139
Thus, an attorney’s own experiences, biases, and values can affect her
ability to convey the client’s story.140 Because a lawyer exercises her
discretion when creating and conveying a compelling story, it is critical
that she understands the influence of her own values or judgment.
Implicit biases play a role in the attorney’s interactions with a client, her
ability to understand and appreciate the client’s situation and objectives,
and her ability to accurately represent her client’s story to a legal
audience.141 An attorney also must understand the impact of implicit
biases on the listener of a client’s story (the judge for purposes of this
Article).142 This discussion will follow a brief overview of judicial
decision-making research.
III. INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
A. Brief Overview of Judicial Decision-making Research
“[J]udges’ early lives, their experiences both on and off the bench, and
their professional careers instill in them certain ideas, beliefs and attitudes
about issues and people . . . .”143 Although most judges believe they are
objective and able to avoid the influence of biases,144 recent studies have
demonstrated that even the most qualified judges may rely on intuitive
135. Id. at 44–45.
136. Id. at 44.
137. Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2421 (1988)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 41.
140. Id. at 44.
141. See id. (discussing how an attorney’s weighing of the substance of a case—including
factual elements, legal factors, and a client’s goals—can affect how the attorney tells the client’s story
and how the audience interprets the same story).
142. See id. at 44–46 (“Lawyers should use [context] clues to help guide their ongoing pursuit
of the client’s narrative and to work with the client to construct a story that will engage the
decisionmaker’s curiosity and compassion without triggering his disbelief or dismissal.”).
143. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1994).
144. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (reporting that 97% of judges in an educational program rated
themselves in the top half of the judges attending the program “in their ability to avoid racial
prejudice in decision[-]making”).
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thought processes, resulting in judgment that is flawed with systemic
errors.145 Judges, like everyone, are the result of their race,146 ethnic
background, nationality, socioeconomic situation,147 gender,148 sexual
orientation, religion, and ideology.149 “Ideally, judges reach their
decisions utilizing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria,
while putting aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other
individuating factors.”150 However, this ideal does not coincide with the
findings of behavioral scientists, whose research has shown that the human
mind is a complex mechanism; regardless of conscious or avowed biases
and prejudices, most people, no matter how well-educated or personally
committed to impartiality, harbor some implicit biases.151 As Judge
Posner explains, using intuition is inevitable and “compelled by the
institutional structure of adjudication.”152 Judges make hundreds, if not
thousands, of judicial decisions in the course of a year, and they have not
the time, before or after casting votes, to engage in “elaborate analytical
145. See Nicole Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception,
AKRON L. REV. 29–33 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (discussing studies of judicial decision-making and the influence of
implicit biases).
146. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of
Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1161–63 (2009) (finding that black judges and
white judges perceive racial harassment differently, which means that the decision-making process is
not completely objective; judges bring their personal experiences, or lack of experience, to bear when
deciding cases).
147. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
137, 141 (2013) (“Because judges are more economically privileged than the average individual
litigant appearing before them, they may be unaware of the gaps between their own experiences and
realities and those of poor people. These gaps have contributed to patterns of judicial decisionmaking that appear to be biased against poor people as compared to others.”).
148. Neil A. Lewis, Debate on Whether Female Judges Decide Cases Differently, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2009, at A16 (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s arguments in a Supreme Court case involving the
appropriateness of the strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl by school authorities). Justice Ginsberg’s
experience as a female may have influenced her interpretation of the issues and brought a new
perspective that would not have been expressed in her absence. Id.; see also Nicole Negowetti, Judicial
Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, AKRON L. REV. 5–6 (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (reviewing the factors
influencing judges intuitive thought processes and decisions).
149. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
706 (2013) (warning that judges have their own biases).
150. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (footnote omitted).
151. See id. at 5 (commenting that a judge’s blind faith in her impartiality may create “a false
sense of confidence” in her decisions, which may cause her to “fail to take into account the
unavoidable influences we all experience as human beings”).
152. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008).

7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN

2014]

Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias

6/24/2014 11:15 AM

301

procedures.”153 The conditions under which judges must make decisions
inevitably lead to reliance on intuitive thinking that can lead to “illusions
of judgment.”154 Given the severe time constraints at every stage of the
decision-making process, “the judge’s reasoning process is primarily
intuitive.”155 Judgments based upon intuition, personal background, or
previous experiences can be unreliable grounds for judicial decisionmaking156 because of the likelihood that implicit biases will influence the
decision.157
As explained in the previous section, an attorney’s primary role is to
effectively present a client’s story, so that it is heard and accepted by the
decisionmaker.158 When crafting a client’s story, an attorney must realize
that it will be understood through the stories already existing in the mind
of the judge.159 These “background” or “stock” stories based on one’s
past experiences are stereotypes about what it means to be an employee, a
parent, etc.160 “When a listener can identify a stock story sufficiently
similar to his own, he makes a ‘likeness judgment.’”161 To process
information rapidly and efficiently, the listener compares the facts of the
153. Id.
154. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001) (“[J]udges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured
conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of
judgment.”).
155. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008).
156. See Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 18 LEGAL COMM. &
RHETORIC: J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 18 (2013) (“[J]udicial intuition [is] unreliable
because judges are unlikely to obtain accurate and reliable feedback on most of the judgments they
make.” (internal quotations omitted)).
157. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001)
(“Although the judges displayed less vulnerability to [illusions of judgment] than other experts and
laypersons . . . under certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically
erroneous judgments.”).
158. See, e.g., Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 46 (2010) (opining that
attorneys persuade by storytelling); see also Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness”
from the Outside: Using Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 61, 77 (2007) (“Stories and storytelling are central components of law and law
practice.”).
159. See, e.g., Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” from the Outside: Using
Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 78
(2007) (declaring that before telling client stories, an attorney must be aware of “the stories already in
the minds of the intended audience”).
160. Id.
161. Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native
Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L.
REV. 457, 464 (2012) (footnote omitted).
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story with a stock story that he already knows, generally accepting the
stock story without analyzing it independently.162 The result of this
information processing in legal decision-making is that the story most
familiar to the judge is usually the one that prevails.163 Due to the need
to clear increasingly expanding dockets,164 judges may substitute their
own stock stories for a litigant’s unfamiliar story, rather than carefully
process and analyze the new information.165 For example, Professor Neitz
recently argued that “[b]ecause judges are more economically privileged
than the average individual litigant appearing before them, they may be
unaware of the gaps between their own experiences and realities and those
of poor people.”166 She explained that this class privilege may lead judges
to assume that all people have comparable experiences.167 “Treating all
parties as though they were socioeconomically identical rises beyond
privilege to the level of bias, precisely because judges have a duty to
consider the unique facts of every case.”168 The experiences of indigent
litigants may be foreign to judges, thus making judges susceptible to
socioeconomic bias in their decision-making processes.169
According to traditional lawyering wisdom, to win a case a lawyer must
proffer the client’s story so that it “resonates with the understanding and
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary
Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 685, 703 (2013) (lamenting that federal judges have tremendous case-loads); see also Diana
Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native Americans Involved in
Interpersonal Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 457, 467–68
(2012) (criticizing the “unrelenting pressure” of judicial economy).
165. Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native
Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L.
REV. 457, 467–68 (2012); see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989) (describing the creation of “stories” to strengthen
the cohesiveness of the group); Christopher Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice
and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 866 (1992) (“The story
telling dilemma in law arises when authoritative discourse and knowledge impede the transfer of the
storyteller’s meaning and images. Hence the receiver’s interpretive understanding of the story is often
at odds with the message intended by the teller.”); Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1,
3 (1984) (“To solve a problem through persuasion of another, we . . . must understand and
manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a plausible and compelling story—
one that moves that person to grant the remedy we want.”).
166. Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137,
141 (2013).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 148.
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expectations that the finder of fact has about a person in the client’s
situation.”170 However, this approach:
[L]imits possible stories a lawyer can tell on behalf of a disempowered client
whose experiences, perspectives, and images are absent from the dominant
legal narratives. . . .
....
. . . . In order to win cases, . . . lawyers must fit their clients’ stories into
law’s established terms by squeezing client identities, histories, and problems
into universalized narratives. The reliance on precedent by both judges and
lawyers blocks the recognition and understanding of stories told that do not
fit with past authoritative accounts.171

Discussing the implications of these issues in detail is beyond the scope
of this Article, but this narrative theory reveals the danger of implicit
biases, which may hinder a judge’s ability to understand and properly
evaluate a litigant’s story.172 Attorneys should understand that although a
case theory based on the client’s story may sound plausible to the attorney
and client, a judge may be unable to understand or credit the story because
it seems unrealistic or improbable from his particular vantage point.173
Vetting a case theory with colleagues, particularly those of different
backgrounds, can thus be a valuable tool.
Armed with this understanding of judicial decision-making, how can an
attorney argue her clients’ cases in ways that will prevent judges from
deferring to their implicit biases? As discussed above, motivation to avoid
the influence of biases has been shown to mitigate the effects of these
biases.174 If a judge is unaware of how implicit biases operate or has no
motivation to avoid these influences, is there anything an advocate can do
170. Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001
UTAH L. REV. 247, 250 (2001).
171. Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 872–73 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
172. Many critical scholars have argued “that the law’s constraints make it impossible for
stories that diverge from the dominant narrative to be heard and recognized.” Laura L. Rovner,
Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 277
(2001).
173. See, e.g., Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for
Native Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5
PHOENIX L. REV. 457, 467–68 (2012) (discussing problems with stock stories in the context of child
custody disputes involving Native American litigants). Jones points out, for example, that “[t]ribal
member litigants, particularly those raised in or around the reservation community, understand that
their stock stories are wholly unfamiliar to judges in the dominant culture.” Id. at 467.
174. See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial
Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011) (finding that perspective-taking
reduces the effects of implicit bias).
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to prevent a judge’s implicit biases from affecting his decision-making? Is
she resigned to accept the influence of these biases and hope for an
outcome not unjustly affected by them? Unfortunately, “[d]espite the
threats to impartiality created by implicit bias on the part of judges,
attorneys, and jurors, protections against it and its effects are few.”175
Although no studies have yet been conducted to directly answer this
question, the following discussion identifies several procedural postures
which are particularly susceptible to the influence of a judge’s implicit
biases and examines how awareness of these implicit bias pitfalls can
inform an attorney’s strategies.
B. From Dispositive Motions to the Appeal: The Influence of Implicit Bias
Analyzing the standards under which federal district court judges decide
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment reveals the pitfalls
of implicit bias in judicial decision-making.176 In deciding whether to
dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),177 a
district judge must decide whether the pleadings contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”178 Thus, a claim is
facially “plausible” only when a “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”179
In any civil case in federal court,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”180 Instead, the plaintiff must
175. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44
CONN. L. REV. 827, 838 (2012).
176. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
706–07 (2013) (arguing that implicit biases may contribute to the high number of employment
discrimination cases that are disposed of via summary judgment).
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
178. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme
Court interpreted this language as preventing the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). In Twombly, the
majority instead announced that pleadings must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court
emphasized that the plausibility standard of Twombly governs the pleading standard “in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684
(2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
180. Id.
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support legal conclusions with “well-pleaded factual allegations,” which
must be taken as true, if scrutinized, to see whether “they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.”181 Whether such facts give rise to a
plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”182
Judge Nancy Gertner explained the difficulty in applying this test: “What
is plausible to me, what my common sense indicates, coming from where I
come from, may not be what is plausible to other judges, what comports
with their common sense.”183 Stated another way, the differences among
judges may lead one judge to dismiss a complaint, while another might
determine that an indistinguishable claim survives, only because of the way
“each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience and common sense.’”184
This standard:
[A]ppeals too much to judicial subjectivity, which inevitably depends (at
least in part) on an individual judge’s background, values, preferences,
education, and attitudes . . . . One does not have to be paranoid to be
concerned that these highly individualistic considerations are at work and
impacting a district judge’s thinking on a motion to dismiss . . . .185

Requiring judges to use their judicial experience and common sense may
be a license to invoke implicit biases, particularly in employment
discrimination cases.186 As Professor Kang and his co-authors explained,
“When we lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely the
state of affairs at the motion to dismiss stage—we have no choice but to
181. Id. at 679.
182. Id.
183. Nancy Gertner, A Judge Hangs Up Her Robes, 38 LITIG. 60, 61 (2012); see Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 335 (2013). (“Does it mean that . . . we are
supposed to be comforted by assuming that judicial experience is homogeneous among members of
the federal bench, or that common sense is generously and equally distributed among them and will
be applied in a uniform manner?”).
184. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (Or More Accurately The Judge) Is Still out for Civil Rights
and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 724 (2013).
185. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 336 (2013).
186. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
706–07 (2013) (arguing that implicit biases may contribute to the high number of employment
discrimination cases that are disposed of via summary judgment); Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal
Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation,
100 KY. L.J. 235, 238 (2012) (examining the subjective standards promulgated by Iqbal and the
resulting potential for implicit judicial bias).
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rely more heavily on our schemas.”187 Thus, deciding whether a claim is
“plausible” based only on “minimal facts that can be alleged before
discovery” may not be sufficient “to ground that judgment in much more
than the judge’s schemas.”188 A recent study of civil rights actions
involving allegations of employment and housing discrimination supports
this reason for concern.189 In this study, Professor Brescia found that
employment and housing discrimination cases are being dismissed at a
higher rate since Ashcroft v. Iqbal190 announced that the plausibility
criterion governs pleading standards in all civil actions in the United States
district courts.191 These findings “may suggest . . . that the subjective
elements of the plausibility standard, . . . may be creeping into judicial
decision-making.”192
Similar arguments have been asserted against the increased granting of
summary judgment motions.193 Considerable scholarship has criticized
the summary judgment standard for potentially permitting a judge to
decide the motion based on his personal, subjective views of the
evidence.194 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
187. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2012)
(footnote omitted). Kang and his co-authors use an example of a Latina plaintiff: “[I]n order to come
to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile general schemas for Latina workers with
individualized data about the specific plaintiff.” Id.
188. Id. at 1162.
189. See id. at 1162–63 (echoing various studies that demonstrate increased dismissal rates for
post-Iqbal federal employment discrimination cases). Kang and his co-authors recognize that it may
not be possible to test whether explicit or implicit biases influence how judges decide motions to
dismiss actual cases. Id. at 1162. However, they also point to preliminary data about dismissal rates
pre and post-Iqbal to support their hypothesis that Iqbal’s plausibility standard poses a risk of
increasing the impact of implicit biases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage for race-discrimination claims in
particular. Id. at 1162–63. See generally Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New
Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012)
(describing a study of judicial decisions in discrimination actions).
190. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
191. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 286 (2012).
192. Id.
193. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1163–64
(2012) (claiming that implicit biases at the summary judgment phase may not be as pervasive because
“more individuating information” will be available to the judge through discovery, but cautioning
that the judge must still make a judgment call that could be subject to implicit biases).
194. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 760 (2009)
(“[T]he terms ‘reasonable jury,’ ‘reasonable juror,’ ‘rational juror,’ ‘rational factfinder,’ and others are
used interchangeably in decisions regarding dispositive motions, even though the terms are capable of
significantly different meanings. This lack of definition makes it more likely that judges decide
dispositive motions based on their own views of the evidence, as opposed to what a reasonable jury
could find.” (footnote omitted)); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143–48 (2007) (propounding that summary judgment is an
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summary judgment can only be granted if there is “no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”195 At summary judgment, judges determine whether a reasonable
jury could find for the defendant.196 In doing so, the judge ultimately sits
as a juror, deciding if she can rule for the plaintiff.197 In other words,
“judges decide the motions based on their own individual views of the
evidence,” and not necessarily on how a reasonable jury would decide.198
Professor Schneider articulated the problems with the application of the
reasonable juror standard: “But what if the judge does not realize the
differences between those views—his or her perspective and those of a
‘reasonable juror’? What if a judge does not have the humility, selfawareness, or insight to recognize the limitations of his or her own
perspective?”199 Deciding a motion for summary judgment, therefore,
creates the risk that implicit biases will seep into the judge’s determination
of “reasonableness.”200
unconstitutional practice because the judge “decides whether the case should be dismissed before a
jury hears the case”).
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
196. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (laying out summary
judgment requirements).
197. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 719 (2007).
198. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 761 (2009).
199. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 766–67 (2007). Authors Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman,
and Donald Braman make an argument similar to Professor Schneider’s, but they also suggest that
judges “engage in a sort of mental double check” before making a summary judgment ruling:
Before concluding . . . that no reasonable juror could find such facts, the judge should try to
imagine who those potential jurors might be. If, as will usually be true, she cannot identify
them, or can conjure only the random faces of imaginary statistical outliers, she should proceed
to decide the case summarily. But if instead she can form a concrete picture of the dissenting
jurors, and they are people who bear recognizable identity-defining characteristics—
demographic, cultural, political, or otherwise—she should stop and think hard. Due humility
obliges her to consider whether privileging her own view of the facts risks conveying a
denigrating and exclusionary message to members of such subcommunities. If it does, she
should choose a different path.
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 898–99 (2009).
200. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short,
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012). In an opinion denying summary
judgment in an age discrimination case, Judge Getner wrote “[D]iscrimination is a complex
phenomenon . . . . It is about concepts like bias and motivation, precisely the kinds of concepts least
suited for resolution by a judge.” Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D.
Mass. 2011) (footnote omitted). Judge Getner further explained that she was “troubled by recent
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The “abuse and overuse” of summary judgment in employmentdiscrimination cases, as well as the potential for implicit biases to affect
decision-making, has been well-documented.201 For instance, results of a
recent study suggest that a judge’s analysis of an employmentdiscrimination case varies based on her race and experiences.202 The study
revealed that white judges are much more likely to dispense with
employment-discrimination cases during the summary judgment stage
than are minority judges, and white judges discard cases that involve
minority plaintiffs “at a much higher rate than cases involving white
plaintiffs.”203 Although there are many ways to explain this trend,204
judges’ implicit biases are at least partly to blame.205 Judge Donald and
her former law clerk recently wrote, “While judges strive to apply the law
fairly and impartially, they are human and therefore must view things
through their own cognitive lenses—judges, like all humans, are not free
from biases. . . . [I]mplicit biases nevertheless ‘strongly influence how
courts decide particular cases especially in the discrimination context.’”206
Judge Bennett predicts that those judges who would deny any implicit bias
might in fact be more likely to be influenced by their inevitable biases.207
statistics that suggest that 70% of summary judgment motions in civil rights cases and 73% of
summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases are granted.” Id. at 322 n.3.
201. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2007) (reporting that summary judgment motions are
granted in 73% of employment discrimination cases, almost always in favor of the defendant); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 112 (2011)
(“Research confirms everyday observations of how much more difficult it is for employment
discrimination plaintiffs than for other plaintiffs to survive pre-trial motions to dismiss their cases and
to win at trial or on appeal” (footnote omitted)).
202. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience,
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 346 (2012).
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., id. (recognizing the weakness in their methodology and that their data “cannot
identify what specific information influences” a judge’s summary judgment decision).
205. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006) (“In
discrimination law, there already is, and there has long been, an ‘intuitive psychologist behind the
bench.’” (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of
Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 835
(2004))).
206. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short,
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 760–61 (2012) (quoting Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 562 (2001)).
207. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
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Research has confirmed, “when a person believes himself to be objective,
such belief licenses him to act on his biases.”208 Judges’ implicit biases
against employment discrimination plaintiffs may also be attributed to “a
shift in society’s understanding of discrimination” in that perhaps many
believe workplace discrimination “is no longer the problem that it was
when Title VII was enacted.”209 As Judge Bennett framed the question,
“So, is it any wonder that, with all these factors coming into play, judges
have increased antipathy to employment discrimination cases, either on an
overt, conscious level or, more likely, in an implicit, unconscious way?”210
An appellate court’s decision is also subject to the influences of implicit
bias.211 Judge Posner has described the process of reviewing cases on
appeal, explaining that appellate judges read parties’ briefs, talk with their
law clerks, listen to oral arguments, and immediately after, briefly discuss
the case with their colleagues, taking a tentative vote that “usually turns
out to be final.”212 Even though a judicial opinion can serve as a check on
implicit bias by requiring the judge to explain how she arrived at her
decision, it is an “imperfect check;” the vote deciding the legal issue is cast
before the opinion is written and most judges do not see their vote as a
706 (2013).
208. Id. at 707 (quoting Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s
True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 208 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short,
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 761 (2012). Professor Trina Jones offers an
additional explanation for plaintiffs’ lack of success in employment discrimination cases:
Because [employment discrimination] claims are premised on the continuing presence of racism,
they are now counter to society’s normative beliefs. Thus, it is not surprising that they are met
with suspicion and skepticism. If judges believe that discrimination is rare and aberrant, then
they will perceive no need to probe deeply an employer’s justifications, even when those
justifications are specious and proved false. Rather, a burden will be placed on plaintiffs to
come forth with additional proof to counter the colorblind, post[-]racial presumption.
Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 433–34 (2010).
210. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
707 (2013) (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2007)).
211. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 129 (2000) (describing the appellate playing field as “unlevel” because
defendants succeed “significantly more often” on appeal than do plaintiffs). The authors attribute
this statistic to the attitudes of appellate judges, who “exhibit a bias in favor of defendants” in order
to counter a “perceived pro-plaintiff bias” in the trial court. Id.
212. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008).
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hypothesis that must be proven through further research.213 Rather, the
research is to find evidence to support the hypothesis.214 The fact that
appellate decisions are not unanimous suggests that judges evaluate the
same facts and legal principles using distinct filters shaped by personal
experience.215
C. Mitigating the Impact of Implicit Biases in Judicial Decision-making
The most important lesson from this Article’s discussion of implicit
biases and their influence on judicial decision-making is that attorneys
should not presume that judges are capable of evaluating information
differently than the rest of humanity—they are not immune from the
influence of implicit biases.216 In light of the cognitive science research
and an understanding of judicial decision-making standards that are
susceptible to the influence of implicit bias, the following section makes
some modest proposals for reducing the influence of these biases.
Although the psychological research regarding deactivation of
stereotypes and implicit biases has not been empirically tested in a legal
setting, some studies in other contexts have demonstrated several ways in
which the activation of stereotypes may be temporarily inhibited.217 For
example, because multiple schemas may apply to one person, making
people focus on only one of those categories “inhibits the activation of
stereotypes associated with another category.”218 To illustrate, “an Asian
213. Id.
214. Id. Searching for support for a pre-determined conclusion is evidence of confirmation
bias, which is a tendency for a person to search for information that “confirms, rather than
contradicts one’s initial judgment . . . .” Id. at 111; see also Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind:
Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1, 32 (2013) (defining confirmation bias by explaining that because people are attached to their
perceptions, they “seek information that confirms” those perspectives and “resist persuasion to the
contrary”).
215. RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW-TO-WIN APPEAL MANUAL: WINNING APPELLATE
ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 2 (3d ed. 2012).
216. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,
706 (2013) (insisting that judges are subject to implicit biases). See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009)
(conducting a study to measure judges’ implicit racial biases and finding, that like most people,
judges “carry implicit biases concerning race”).
217. See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331–32 (2012) (providing
ways in which stereotypes may be temporarily inhibited).
218. Id. at 331 (quoting Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
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female mechanic,” would be associated with different schemas for Asian,
female, and mechanic.219 By emphasizing the mechanic schema, for
instance, the stereotypes regarding Asians and females may be
deactivated.220 There is also evidence that role schemas may supersede
racial or gender schemas because people use their “role” schemas first.221
Thus, when a person encounters an African-American police officer, for
example, the “police officer” schema will ostensibly govern the
interaction.222 In telling a client’s story, effective attorneys understand
that they should “humanize their clients.”223 Professor Blasi explains that
doing so “means conveying the multidimensional complexity of human
beings who may otherwise be understood by reference to one label or
group.”224 In other words, to preclude a judge from activating racial or
gender stereotypes, an attorney should highlight the individual and
complex characteristics of the client.225 Psychological research also shows
that avoiding the influences of stereotypes in decision-making requires a
decisionmaker to put forth more effort and time to gathering individuating
information about the litigant, rather than relying on her triggered
stereotypes.226 Hence, to weaken the impact of gender stereotypes,
providing personalized information about a particular woman may

Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1241, 1253 (2002) (reviewing studies that have demonstrated a “rebound effect,” in which the active
suppression of stereotypes leads to increased stereotyping in the future).
219. Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331 (2012).
220. Id.
221. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1503 n. 63 (2005) (citing
SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 143 (2d ed. 1991)).
222. Id.; Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331 (2012).
223. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1279 (2002).
224. Id.
225. Id.; see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of
9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 286 (2012) (recommending
that decisionmakers avoid relying on stereotypes by using a “bottom-up model” for constructing
decisions, rather than beginning with stereotypical predispositions).
226. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 286 (2012); see also Gary Blasi,
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1253
(2002) (remarking that one can control the automatic activation of stereotypes by “devoting time and
cognitive resources to focusing on individuating information”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2012) (forewarning that during the motion to dismiss
phase, judges “lack sufficient individuating information,” which leaves them with no other option
“but to rely more heavily” on their schemas).
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suppress pervasive gender stereotypes.227 When the imparted information
is “concrete, unambiguous, and explicitly relevant to the judgment at
hand,” a judge’s reliance on stereotypes dwindles and more credence is
given to the substantive facts about the individual.228 Applying the
lessons from these studies, an attorney should recognize the significance of
conveying to the court a client’s complete story, emphasizing specific and
individuating facts.229
It may also be possible to control stereotypes by priming persons with
ideals of fairness and equality.230 Results of several studies indicate that
people can cultivate cognitive habits that subdue stereotyping.231 For
example, people primed using scrambled sentences that included words
like “helpful” and “friendly”—words associated with cooperation—were
more predisposed to “cooperate in potentially competitive games.”232
The results of the study evince that priming people with “fairness or
egalitarian goals” might prompt subconscious cognitions that could
potentially abate the consequences of automatic stereotype activation.233
In light of these findings, to suppress the activation of stereotypes, an
attorney should present a client’s story in a way that “appeal[s] to the
judge’s spirit of justice.”234 Judge Fine’s observations also support this
advice. Regardless of their personal philosophies and backgrounds,

227. See Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” from the Outside: Using Case
Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 82 (2007)
(“Psychological theory holds that individual information concerning a particular woman is believed
to have an impact on disassembling descriptive stereotypes.” (footnote omitted)).
228. See id. (quoting Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should
Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 665, 686 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[P]arties can thwart the stereotypes
inherent in thinking . . . by presenting specific facts while telling the story from her point of view.”).
229. Id.
230. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1253 (2002) (detailing a way in which to work against developing stereotypes);
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160–62 (2012) (addressing
tactics for avoiding reliance on schemas by providing information to the decisionmaker proactively).
231. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1254 (2012).
232. Id. In contrast, subjects that were primed with words correlated with achievement—such
as “win,” or “compete”—were more persistent in their attempts to solve the puzzles, “suggesting that
the priming had altered their motivational level.” Id. (footnote omitted).
233. Id.
234. Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 983, 983 (2011). In the appellate context, Professor Lewis posits that appealing to
the judge’s sense of justice will result in a favorable ruling for the client on appeal: “If the client
suffered an injustice in the court below, the judge will seek to ‘do justice’ for the client.” Id.

7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN

2014]

Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias

6/24/2014 11:15 AM

313

appellate judges desire to do what they consider to be “right.”235
Although what is “right” is difficult to define without context, Judge Fine
asserts that in reading an appellate brief, a judge must be “made to see that
your client deserves to win.”236 A judge may be so persuaded through
effective storytelling.237 For example, Professor Chestek recommends
portraying a client as the protagonist of a story and the opposing party as
an antagonist who is harmful to the client’s interests.238 A client’s story
should be presented in a compelling and captivating way so as to make the
court agree with the client’s position.239 Professor Lewis explains, “Once
immersed in a human drama, the judge looks for the interplay between the
captivating story and justice. For the appellate judge is keenly sensitive to
the possibility that your client was the unwitting victim of an
injustice.”240 Thus, in priming the judge to focus on goals of justice and
fairness, an attorney may help suppress the judge’s implicit biases.
Although the above suggestions are merely theoretical as they apply to
advocacy, recognition of implicit biases and motivation to control their
influences has been shown to be successful in reducing the effects of these
biases on decision-making.241 When judges are aware of the necessity of
monitoring their own reactions to check for the influence of implicit
biases, coupled with a motivation to defeat those biases, they seem able to
overcome them.242 Thus, increasing awareness of the problems with
235. RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW TO WIN APPEAL MANUAL: WINNING APPELLATE
ARGUMENTS IN A NUTSHELL 14 (3d ed. 2012).
236. Id.; see also Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL
WRITING J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 144 (2008) (alleging that if the judge sympathizes with a
client’s story, she will be more prone to decide in the client’s favor).
237. See Harry Pregerson & Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, The Seven Virtues of Appellate Brief
Writing: An Update from the Bench, 38 SW. L. REV. 221, 226 (2008) (intimating that appellate brief
writers should consider borrowing storytelling techniques from writers in other fields, like journalism,
and use these techniques “to craft compelling stories that make the reader want to continue reading”).
238. Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING:
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 144 (2008); see also Brian L. Porto, Improving Your Appellate Briefs:
The Best Advice from Bench, Bar, and Academy, VT. B.J., Winter 2011, at 36, 38 (identifying
complaints from appellate judges about lawyers’ briefs that lack effective storytelling).
239. See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Improving Your Appellate Briefs: The Best Advice from Bench, Bar,
and Academy, VT. B.J., Winter 2011, at 36, 38 (advocating narratives to convey the “essence of the
case”).
240. Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 983, 996 (2011).
241. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (conducting a study on implicit biases harbored by judges and
concluding that those biases can be suppressed with the proper motivation).
242. Id. at 1221.
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implicit bias may be the best solution for reducing the impact of these
biases in judicial decisions.243 From a practical perspective, attorneys can
focus the judge’s attention on the legal standards under which a motion or
brief should be reviewed.244 For example, in arguing against the granting
of summary judgment, Judge Donald and J. Eric Pardue suggest that
“[r]eminding judges to liberally interpret the reasonableness of potential
inferences provides a buffer, however slight, against the tendency to
substitute their judgment for the jury’s.”245 Because the plausibility
standard from Iqbal has been applied inconsistently by the lower
courts,246 a plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss may have
the opportunity propose a standard for plausibility that allows a judge to
recognize the dangers of implicit bias in making such a determination. A
standard, such as one adopted by the Eastern District of Texas247, could
help judges consider plausibility more liberally, to prevent a judge from
grounding his decision in his schemas.248 As the magistrate concluded:
[T]he critical inquiry is whether a plaintiff’s claim is “conceivable” (not
enough for Rule 12) or “plausible” (sufficient for Rule 12). . . . The majority
in Swanson put it this way: “As we understand it, . . . the plaintiff must give
enough details about the subject matter of the case to present a story that
holds together. In other words, the court will ask itself could these things
243. See id. (postulating that a judge’s increased self-awareness of her own implicit biases may
actually reduce their effects).
244. See Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 983, 997 (2011) (pointing out that the standard of review “implicates how you write
your client’s narrative”).
245. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short,
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012).
246. See Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559, 577
(2011) (criticizing the Iqbal opinion for imprecisely articulating the new pleading standard which has
led to its inconsistent application at the trial court level).
247. Escuadra v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
This standard was based on Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, a United States Supreme Court case
decided in 2007 that involved the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See generally Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting the standard for pleadings in a
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act case). Professor Reinert clarifies the Supreme Court
opinion: “Specifically, the Court in Tellabs defined ‘plausibility’ for the purposes of the PSLRA
[Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] as equipoise: that is, if the plaintiff’s theory of relief was ‘at
least compelling’ as the alternative explanations, the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss
under the PSLRA.” Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559,
583 (2011) (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324).
248. See Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559, 583–84
(2011) (praising the Eastern District of Texas for conducting “an extensive analysis of the plausibility
problem”).
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have happened, not did they happen.”249

Including information about how implicit bias can affect and taint
decision-making in a complaint, motion, jury instructions, or brief can call
attention to the problem.250 Exposure to the implicit bias research may
help a judge minimize her implicit bias when deciding motions or
appeals.251 However, an attorney is likely to exercise restraint in doing
so—naturally, people do not like being accused of hosting biases, even
unconscious ones.252 Although an attorney should make the judge aware
of implicit biases, she may not want the judge to interpret the information
as implying that the judge is biased.253 An effective lawyer challenges the
judge to move beyond a common schema without accusing the judge of
bias.254 For instance, when representing a father in a custody bench trial,
counsel might open with: “Your Honor, although the ‘tender years’
doctrine of young children always being awarded to the mother has been
overturned, it appears to be alive and well in a few cases. In this case, the
father is seeking custody based on the following factors.”255 This
particular method of arguing reminds the judge of a specific bias without
accusing her of embracing the bias.256
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo explained: “Deep below consciousness are other forces,
the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex
249. Escuadra, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
404 (7th Cir. 2010)).
250. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1275 (2002) (noting awareness of prejudice or stereotypes is most often the first
step to reducing the effects); Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit
Bias Can Be Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21 available at
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf (“[A]ll of the research
seems to indicate that once people are made aware of implicit bias, it disappears.”).
251. See Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21 available at
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf (touting the research of
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and company, reviewing their findings that awareness of implicit bias can reduce
its effects); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (examining judicial bias according to decisions).
252. Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21, available at
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf.
253. See id. (addressing the need for caution when addressing race).
254. Id.
255. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id.
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of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the
man, whether he be litigant or judge . . . .”257 The implicit biases of
attorneys and judges pervert the processes and results in both civil and
criminal litigation, and innately impede equal justice for all.258 It
therefore behooves attorneys to understand the emerging cognitive science
research regarding implicit bias and decision-making. Because awareness
and the motivation to correct one’s thinking is the “best cure thus far” for
implicit bias,259 state bar associations and law firms should follow the
ABA’s lead to educate attorneys about this pervasive problem.260 With
greater awareness among the legal community of how implicit biases
operate, it is this author’s hope that researchers will explore and empirically
test proposals to address the problems of implicit bias in our legal system,
motivating legal decisionmakers to correct their thinking.261

257. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 3, 5 (1988) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167
(1921)).
258. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON IMPLICIT BIAS, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
259. Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIGATION NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 20 available at
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf.
260. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON IMPLICIT BIAS, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
261. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal
System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1581 (2013) (calling for “an expansion of some of the more
promising concepts from psychological studies to a broader audience, including not just judges, but
every lawyer, client, juror, witness, and court employee, before legal proceedings can begin in any
given case”).
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